![]() Kirby added that any potential new deals could include “multiple types of munitions” and raw materials from North Korea. North Korea delivered infantry rockets and missiles into Russia for use by Wagner forces late last year, and the potential deal being discussed would provide Russian troops with many more weapons, according to National Security Council spokesman John Kirby. Sullivan said it was an “open question about how much material and what the quality of the material is that could be provided.” But, he added, “I think it says a lot that Russia is having to turn to a country like North Korea to seek to bolster its defense capacity, in a war that it expected would be over in a week.” ![]() Commentary gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based on their professional expertise and often on their peer-reviewed research and analysis.Since the war began, “we have not seen (North Korea) actively supply large amounts of munitions or other military capacity to Russia,’ he said, adding that it’s not clear “what has changed in their calculus.” This commentary originally appeared on The National Interest on July 12, 2021. candidate at the Pardee RAND Graduate School and a U.S. ![]() Bennett is a senior defense analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. The remainder of this commentary is available at .īruce W. It may be possible that China's cold war with the United States is blindsiding Beijing's leadership with respect to the developing North Korean threat.… Its current lack of concern is somewhat at odds with Beijing's typical long-term strategic thinking. Siegfried Hecker, a former director of Los Alamos who has visited the North Korean Yongbyon nuclear facility several times, North Korea may have 45 or so nuclear weapons.Ĭhina might want to consider whether they have reason to be concerned about the mid- to longer-term geopolitical implications of an unrestrained North Korean nuclear weapons program. While this number would be a small fraction of the Chinese population, it would be a large fraction of its core leadership, risking government continuity. A single North Korean nuclear weapon with the yield (explosive power) of the North's sixth nuclear weapon test could kill or seriously injure several million people in Beijing. The problem with these perspectives is that it fails to recognize the actual threat posed to China by North Korean nuclear weapons. China would favor this outcome as it would weaken U.S. alliances with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. Once North Korea's nuclear weapons are paired with a significant number of ICBMs over the next few years, they will raise questions about the U.S. Moreover, Beijing is likely pleased that North Korea wants to drive U.S. North Korea's denuclearization efforts remain a secondary concern for China, Beijing apparently perceiving that Pyongyang's nuclear weapons pose a minimal threat to China. Despite Beijing's rhetoric purporting the desire for an eventual denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, China's priority has always been maintaining the geopolitical status quo in the region. ![]() ![]() From a Chinese perspective, while Kim's nuclear weapons may not be ideal, the situation could become more dangerous should a power vacuum be introduced. Kim likely wants the border closed to also limit Chinese influence and leverage in the North's internal affairs.Ĭhina's main goal with North Korea has always been regional stability. In many ways, COVID-19 provided a convenient excuse for Kim Jong-un to close the borders in the name of public health while simultaneously signaling to Beijing that he did not want Chinese aid, even if it meant having to starve his own people. Despite the current border closures between their two countries, China and North Korea remain resolutely pledged to a “blood-alliance.” But this partnership has vastly different implications depending on which side of the border you consider. ![]()
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